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Rethinking Energy Statecraft: United States foreign policy and the changing geopolitics of 
energy 
 




Abstract: The United States Administration has an opportunity to foster a new energy statecraft 
based on the realities of a dynamic and rapidly-changing global energy marketplace. The 
geopolitical considerations of this energy transition are not well-explored. Additionally, the recent 
renaissance of oil and gas in the U.S has reinforced the alluring notion that energy independence 
and national energy security are the same thing. But the global nature of energy markets expose 
this notion as utterly misleading. A re-envisaged energy statecraft would utilize a variety of U.S. 
foreign policy and multilateral tools to reform the international energy sector, protect the global 
energy marketplace, and spur investments in new generation and innovation. These steps require 
building an integrated approach to the multiple energy-security challenges. 
 
 
Policy Implications  
 
 The energy transition is already changing the geopolitical landscape, which demands a 
modernized approach to energy statecraft. 
  
 U.S. foreign policy should abandon attempting to achieve so-called energy independence. 
 
 Instead, energy statecraft should focus on protecting the global energy trading system and 
deploy public policy tools to spur investment in new energy systems and technologies.  
  
ENERGY AND SECURITY 
 
Energy may be central to United States’ foreign policy, but we are living in the past. The new 
administration thus has an opportunity to foster a new energy statecraft based on the realities of a 
dynamic and rapidly-changing global energy marketplace.  
 
The dominant energy security policy of the United States has long been formalized by the Carter 
Doctrine, which stated that any effort by a hostile power to block the flow of oil from the Persian 
Gulf would be viewed as an assault on the vital interests of the United States, and would be repelled 
by “any means necessary, including military force.” Officials continue to interpret energy 
statecraft largely through this oil lens, sometimes accompanied by the ebb and flow in popularity 
of so-called energy independence. However, the massive transitions now apparent in the global 
energy sector, and the technological revolution underway in nearly all aspects of modern energy, 
demand an evolution in the U.S. foreign policy approach (Pasqual and Elkind, 2010; Bordoff, 
2016).  
The U.S. Department of State acknowledges that, “energy is at the nexus of national security, 
economic prosperity, and the environment”, and defines its role as managing “the geopolitics of 
today’s energy economy through reinvigorated energy diplomacy with major producers and 
consumers of energy” (Department of State, 2017). The Department added a Bureau of Energy 
Resources (S/ENR) in 2011, and it has, in the past few years, begun moving beyond a focus solely 
on issues related to the flow of global or regional commodities. The U.S. government has turned 
to the intricacies of electricity, including issues related to growing regional interconnection, and 
more focus on distributed technologies, diverse generation portfolios, and local autonomy. But this 
doesn’t yet go far enough.  
 
MULTIPLE ENERGY TRANSITIONS 
The “energy transition” is an inchoate concept. Classically understood to encompass shifts in the 
national supply of energy or the discovery of new energy resources, energy transitions are now 
also conceptualized to include transformations in the markets that deliver energy, in addition to 
conversions in end-use devices such as air conditioners, light bulbs, or engines, or even the 
“systems of systems” that delivery energy services (Sovacool 2016; Grubler, 2016).  In its recent 
formulation, it refers to a confluence of issues from rapid cost declines in renewable energy 
systems like wind and solar, to the U.S. shale “revolution,” to IT advances in smart grids, to 
innovative new business and contract models (Grubler, 2012; Smil, 2016). As a result of these 
changes, the way energy is produced, distributed and consumed around the world, however, is 
undergoing radical change. Global economic strength is shifting from developed to developing 
countries, not coincidentally mirroring shifts in future energy demand and investment. At the same 
time, many countries are struggling to upgrade their energy systems to fully support the interlinked 
requirements of security, sustainability, and economic growth. Additionally, the convergence of 
physical infrastructure and digital technologies require decision-makers to adapt beyond static 20th 
Century approaches.  
While the climate change impacts of the transition are being well-monitored and being linked to 
security,i less so are the other energy-related considerations. We can outline some of the likely 
aspects, each complex on their own: 1) institutional shifts in the influence and membership of 
multilateral organizations like the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the 
far smaller International Energy Agency (IEA); 2) the accelerating growth of trade in natural gas 
either through new international pipelines or via a rapidly expanding market for liquefied natural 
gas (LNG); 3) intellectual property and R&D issues in the development of cutting-edge clean edge 
technologies and their trade; 4) issues of cybersecurity that are growing in importance with the rise 
of interconnected systems and new forms of metering and system operations; 5) the changing 
landscape for conflict and other minerals due to these changes in technologies; 6) the growing 
regional interconnection in electricity grids from the silk road to East Africa; and 7) the enormous 
issue plaguing developing countries: lingering energy poverty and the demand for provision of 
quality and affordable energy services to billions of people and businesses.   
 
Examples of this changing geopolitical-energy landscape abound. The viability of OPEC to 
influence oil price is lessening, and the IEA is broadening its traditional rich country (OECD) base 
(Owyang, 2017; IEA, 2017). The rise in exports from the U.S. in LNG is changing the supply 
demand contours of the market, while at the same time Russian-led pipelines are shifting decisions 
about investment in the sector (World Oil Online, 2017). The U.S China solar trade dispute, and 
Chinese leadership in clean energy investment has altered the clean energy landscape (Hughes, 
2017). Cybersecurity is affecting not only how smart grids are designed, but critical infrastructure 
as well (Bronk, 2014). The high-tech components now critical for global power systems and 
technology is putting pressure on conflict minerals (de Ridder, 2013). Projects like the CASA 1000 
high-voltage regional transmission line from the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan through 
Afghanistan and to Pakistan have multiple geopolitical concerns (CASA-1000, 2017). The lack of 
quality energy services in sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia has multiple impacts on issues 
such as urbanization and migration (USAID, 2017). In short, the web of energy, technology, 
economics, and national security is thickening.  
 
 
BUILDING ON THE PAST 
 
The recent renaissance of oil and gas in the U.S has reinforced the alluring notion that energy 
independence and national energy security are the same thing. But the global nature of energy 
markets expose this notion as utterly misleading. Two-thirds of global oil and gas production is 
traded internationally. Russia, one of the largest exporters of gas and oil, imports high quality 
uranium, machinery, equipment, and electricity. Petro-giant Saudi Arabia must import refined 
gasoline and a host of extractive industrial technology, and is now looking at a massive push into 
solar energy. Even the vast and bountiful United States cannot escape global markets. The U.S. 
exports coal and liquefied natural gas, yet still imports crude oil and rare earth minerals. And it 
seems the expected opening up of Federal lands for new coal mining will not make much of a dent 
in that market or its prices.  
 
Shortages or the disruption of energy services can no longer be treated as independent catastrophes 
that can alone be solved by military action, but as interwoven threats to the world at large with 
potentially great destabilizing effects. The Defense Department’s most recent Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR) highlights how instability may be increased in the coming years by a 
competition for resources, including energy and water, which could escalate regional 
confrontations into broader conflicts (Department of Defense, 2014). As a result, new approaches 
to planning are needed and these can be supported by diplomacy (Bazilian and Chattopadhyay, 
2016). 
 
While U.S. diplomats don’t seem ready for this new world, the good news is that they have 
successfully deployed strategic energy statecraft in the past. The Marshall Plan was one of the 
most successful early examples (Marshall Foundation, 2017). America invested in infrastructure 
in Europe —for instance, the Limber Dam in Austria and the Genissiat hydroelectric project in 
France—to aid recovery and to expand markets for U.S. goods. President Eisenhower’s Atoms for 
Peace program is another case of energy diplomacy, which led to further programs in high energy 
physics and technology that enabled innovations like medical isotopes, food irradiation, and even 
space exploration (Eisenhower Presidential Library, 2017). During the Cold War, investment in 
energy infrastructure—such as the use of the World Bank to build large-scale hydroelectric dams 
in Vietnam, Ghana, and other former European colonies—helped to counter growing Soviet 
influence. Today’s U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) makes numerous 






Others are acknowledging these interdependencies and interconnections. As an example, the new 
Director of the International Energy Agency immediately began to expand the scope of that agency 
beyond the OECD and extending his hand towards China, Mexico, India, and others. U.S. 
policymakers need to acknowledge more players in the international scene, and accept that they 
are in fact competing with China, India, and Russia in their efforts to acquire resources abroad and 
form international partnerships. Other institutions are entering the picture too (Van de Graaf and 
Zelli, 2016).  
 One of the latest strategies for advancing energy statecraft can be seen in the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) founded in 2014. This multilateral institution led by China has approved 
financing for energy projects in Myanmar, Pakistan and Bangladesh. These efforts have been seen 
as a diplomatic and strategic victory for the Chinese government in advancing its influence beyond 
its borders. Its energy strategy is now being developed, and in a public and transparent manner 
through a series of consultations.ii  
 
Energy statecraft unavoidably requires global cooperation too. During the 2014 G-7 summit, the 
Energy Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States outlined principles that strengthen energy security as a core component of economic and 
national security (Press Statement by European Commission, 2014; IEP, 2016). These include the 
development of flexible, transparent and competitive energy markets; diversification of energy 
fuels, sources and routes, and encouragement of indigenous sources of energy supply; enhancing 
energy efficiency in demand and supply, and demand response management; and improving 
energy systems resilience by promoting infrastructure modernization and supply and demand 
policies that help withstand systemic shocks.   
 
A recent positive example of energy statecraft in action which makes linkages between U.S. 
national security, global growth, and human development is Power Africa and the supporting 
Electrify Africa Act (USAID, 2017; Moss, 2016). The initiative was originally borne out of 
diplomatic discussions with key national security allies—such as Kenya, Ethiopia, and Nigeria 
which are all essential partners in the fight against terrorism— about what steps the United States 
could take to bolster governance and capabilities in those states. Although security is not the stated 
focus of efforts to address energy poverty, the evolving harmony of interests between the private 
sector and the American and African governments both support conditions in the recipient 
countries for more stable societies that help counter, rather than export, extremist violence.  
 
Such geopolitical complexities, and a global energy system under transition, demand an ambitious 
agenda that requires an expansive diplomacy. The shortcomings in the current interpretations of 
energy statecraft appear in greater relief given the interconnectivity of energy systems, trade in 
energy fuels, consortiums of investors, governing institutions, and transboundary pollution.  A re-
envisaged approach, addressing some or all of these themes, would utilize a variety of foreign 
policy and multilateral tools to protect the global energy marketplace and spur investment in new 
generation and innovation, while addressing multiple energy-security challenges.  The current 
Administration, and even those after it, would do well to embrace, rather than ignore, such 
dynamics. 
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